Region - Province - Municipality: Spatial Planning and Spatial Policy in Italy, 1860-2016 by Jansen, Christian
www.ssoar.info
Region - Province - Municipality: Spatial Planning
and Spatial Policy in Italy, 1860-2016
Jansen, Christian
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jansen, C. (2017). Region - Province - Municipality: Spatial Planning and Spatial Policy in Italy, 1860-2016. Historical
Social Research, 42(2), 267-294. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.42.2017.2.267-294
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51883-8
Historical Social Research 42 (2017) 2, 267-294 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.2.267-294 
Region – Province – Municipality. Spatial Planning 
and Spatial Policy in Italy, 1860-2016 
Christian Jansen ∗ 
Abstract: »Region – Provinz – Stadt. Raumplanung und Raumpolitik in Italien, 
1860-2016«. This article explores the history of regions, centralism and regional-
ism in Italy ‒ a highly controversial political field of state reorganization over 150 
years. Focusing on the status of regions within Italy’s political power structure 
and the development of the multi-level governance system, the article draws a 
line from the foundation of the Italian national state in 1860/61 to the immedi-
ate present. It examines political aspirations for decentralized structures and 
changing perceptions of how to reorganize the state to create efficient structures 
in different eras as well as power shifts between the different political levels. The 
article shows that Italian politics oscillated between centralism and regionalism. 
Reforms took place against the backdrop of different political systems and public 
debates in a heterogonous country. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Italian 
public discussed a federal structure and decentralization. Altogether, reforms 
were implemented inconsistently, slowly and gradually: The long-term analysis 
highlights the complexity of constitutional reforms within the background of a 
set of actor’s including regionalist movements, political parties and traditionalist 
and regionalist sentiments. What we observe is a highly ideological debate on de-
centralization followed by reservations and resistances across the state. The arti-
cle concludes that looking at today’s Italian politics, attempts for recentralization 
are gaining ground again. However, the article identifies several dimensions of 
state transformation. Notions of efficiency and legitimacy have to be taken in 
account just as much as regional self-interests, diverse structures inherited from 
the past and the asymmetry of the Italian federalist system. The author stresses 
the need for a more holistic approach, for a detailed examination of the relation-
ship between those dimensions together with a shift in global power structures. 
The contribution thus proceeds to develop a multifaceted framework in order to 
facilitate further research, to understand more fully the shift of power within the 
Italian multi-level system. 
Keywords: History of regions, regionalism, centralization, Italy, multi-level sys-
tem, state reorganization, constitutional reforms. 
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1.  Introduction 
Given its meandering historical emergence, the status of the regions within 
Italy’s political power structure is an interesting example for a certain political-
territorial form that evolved in an almost 150-year-long (and still ongoing) 
process and is today an important, in some areas the most important level of 
power. Several different actors with various political and economic interests 
were involved in this process. Due to the source material available today and 
the requirements of the current state of research it is often impossible to ana-
lyse precisely why and when institutional reconfigurations and power shifts 
between the different political levels (central state, region, province and munic-
ipality) occurred.  
In what follows I will draw a line from the foundation of the Italian national 
state in 1860/61 – and briefly look at its background history and the peculiari-
ties of Italian nationalism as far as they are relevant for the development of the 
multi-level governance system – to the immediate present. 
Since the foundation of the nation state in the 1860s, the Italian multi-level 
system consisted of three levels (municipality, province and central state). In 
1946, regions as a further level were established as consequence of the experi-
ences of the centralist, ‘totalitarian’ fascismo. As a political concept the imple-
mentation of this level had been discussed since the foundation of the nation 
state. Today, Italy comprises 20 regions (including five autonomous regions), 
110 provinces and 8,047 municipalities (most of them unchanged since the 
nineteenth century) at the level below the central state. A territorial reform has 
never happened in Italy, even though the number of provinces has gradually 
increased. Fourteen bigger cities, former provincial capitals, were declared città 
metropolitane in 2015. They constituted in these cases the third level of the 
political system. 
2.  The Starting Point 
With a length from north to south of roughly 1,200 km, Italy is a very hetero-
geneous country in terms of climate, vegetation and roads and transport infra-
structure, reaching from high alpine to arid areas, from a central European to a 
Mediterranean climate zone. Long distance traffic from north to south has to 
cross the Apennine Mountains, the alpine backbone of Italy, whose lowest 
passes are 700m above sea level. There are only a few navigable rivers, and 
nearly all of them run from west to east. Coastal shipping has always played an 
important role for the north-south route, not least to connect the two large is-
lands Sicily and Sardinia, accounting for a sixth of the Italian territory, with the 
mainland.  
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In addition to this heterogeneous landscape, the country experienced histori-
cal processes and developed traditions and cultures that varied from region to 
region. Three characteristic features can be summarised: firstly, from the fall of 
the Roman Empire in the fifth century until 1871 – that is for more than 1,200 
years – the peninsula was not united as a state but had a polycentric structure. 
Secondly, large parts of the country belonged to the Habsburg Monarchy and 
the Spanish Empire; even France considered some areas their sphere of influ-
ence. As a result none of the different Italian dynasties could achieve power 
over the whole country. Furthermore, Italy is shaped by a very strong republi-
can tradition with its proud city-states such as Florence, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, 
Milan, Siena, Lucca, etc., and the anti-imperial Lombard League established in 
1184, which still lends tradition and its name to North Italian regionalism.  
Thirdly, Italy has been culturally and politically divided for centuries. De-
spite modernisation, these long-lasting historical divergences left their mark 
until today and are difficult to overcome. From late antiquity, Italy’s South has 
pursued its own political and cultural course. The line between today’s regions, 
Marche, Latium and Umbria on the one hand and Abruzzi, Molise and Campa-
nia on the other (see maps), separated the South Italian-Sicilian kingdom from 
the Papal States. It is one of the longest lasting and most influential dividing 
lines in Europe. The South was rather homogeneous and geared towards the 
cultural centres of Naples and Palermo, rich in Arab influences and with closer 
cultural and dynastic ties to Spain than to the rest of Italy. The North was terri-
torially fragmented and politically and culturally shaped by the republican 
tradition of the city-states. The Papal States served as an additional barrier 
between South and North Italy. 
Thus, conditions were not favourable for the emergence of a pan-Italian 
identity and the process of nation-building started later on the Peninsula than in 
other parts of Europe. It received a significant boost when the Genevese histo-
rian Simonde de Sismondi published his Histoire des Républiques Italiennes du 
Moyen Âge (A History of the Italian Republics) in Paris in 1807-1818. He was 
the first to include the history of the many city-states into a homogeneous nar-
rative of Italian history. He emphasised unity in diversity and defined national 
identity based on the history of the important city republics, which, according 
to de Sismondi, had significantly contributed to the Renaissance of European 
civilisation and brought the first flourishing of political freedom in Europe 
(Simonde de Sismondi 1836; cf. Lyttleton 2001, 163). Leading politicians of 
the risorgimento movement – the Italian nation-building between 1848 and 
1871 – such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Carlo Cattaneo, who coined the famous 
expression of Italy as the country of the 100 cities (Italia delle cento città), 
were highly influenced by Sismondi’s view of history. It is rather telling that 
the book of a French-Swiss historian published in France had such an impact 
on the first generation of the intellectuals of the risorgimento movement. Un-
like former absolutist countries, modern state building was advanced only in 
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the North of the Apennines peninsula, the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and 
the north-eastern territories belonging to the Habsburg Monarchy. In central 
regions (Papal States) and in the South a feudalist system prevailed.  
3.  Setting the Course towards a Centralist Structure in 
the Risorgimento Movement and the Development 
until 1945 
In order to foster internal nation building processes after the foundation of the 
Kingdom of Italy in 1861, liberal politicians decided on a centralist structure, 
modelled on the French example, given the heterogeneity of the country. As 
educational dictatorship it was supposed to unify living conditions and create 
national coherence. Just as in Spain at the same time and in Turkey half a cen-
tury later nationalist elites pinned their hopes on the Jacobinic centralist model 
that during the French revolution had been supposed to bring “traditionalist” 
and “reactionary” regions to their knees and to force them towards modernity 
(see Seitz 1997, 8 et seq.; Keating 1988, 48). Only the political experiences of 
the twentieth century and the catastrophes caused by centralist dictatorships of 
Fascism, National Socialism and Bolshevism cast doubt on the equation cen-
tralisation = modernisation. After World War II the victorious powers estab-
lished regions (single states) in the previously fascist countries to counterbal-
ance the central state. 
However, already 150 years ago a distinctive faction within the risorgimento 
movement formulated key arguments in favour of federalism and wanted to 
extend the classical ‘horizontal’ separation of powers as laid down by Montes-
quieu, by adding a vertical division between different state level. In Italy with 
its many municipalities rich in tradition there were only few regions with his-
torically evolved statehood at an intermediate level. Unlike the already existing 
single states in Germany the Italian lands were, however, not suitable as pillars 
of a federalist system. Only very few of them were characterised by internal 
state cohesion, and if so then most likely in the North, for instance in Tuscany, 
which had been reorganised in the eighteenth century by Grand Duke Leopold, 
the later Austrian emperor. But just like the duchies Parma and Modena,1 Tus-
cany was a Habsburg secundogeniture and thus, according to the emerging 
nationalist view, their dukes were foreign rulers. The situation was even clearer 
in the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, which was a well-structured state but as 
part of the Habsburg Monarchy geared towards Vienna. During the revolution in 
1848 and again during the war of independence in 1859, the rulers and ministers 
                                                             
1  The Congress of Vienna created a Duchy of Lucca. It was passed to Tuscany, since there was 
no successor to the throne.  
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of these regions had fled to Austria. They had no legitimacy of their own and 
could not hold their ground without being backed up by the Austrian army. Also, 
it became very clear how seriously the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, the most 
important Italian state, took the “national” borders of his territory: he and his 
liberal prime minister Camillo Cavour traded Savoy, the home land of his ruling 
dynasty, and the area surrounding Nice with France for military support. Conse-
quently the nationalist public condemned him as an absolutist “country haggler.”  
Even more difficult and thus less suitable to serve as foundation of a federal 
state was the situation in Central and South Italy. Central Italy was under abso-
lutist rule of the pope (see map 1). After uprisings in the northern regions the 
Papal States lost the territories won from the seventh to the fifteenth century 
north of the Patrimonium Petri. While today’s Latium was part of the Papal 
States until 1870, the Marche, Umbria and Emilia-Romagna had already joined 
the Kingdom of Italy in 1860. The Vatican State as well as the entire South – 
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with the capital Naples – had not yet achieved 
a modern form of statehood or, more specifically, Italian nationalists regarded 
their existing forms of statehood as outdated and not worth preserving. 
Figure 1: Italy before the Foundation of the Nation State  
 
By Gigillo83 - Image:Italy 1494 shepherd.jpg, CC BY-SA 3.0, 
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=12875784> 
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Despite this difficult situation and partly by misjudging the profound argu-
ments against a federal structure,2 many Italian nationalists were federalists. 
The liberal Catholic Vincenzo Gioberti advocated a federation presided by the 
pope, which was, however, declined by Pius IX in 1848 after initial considera-
tions. The pope’s U-turn against the foundation of the Italian nation state gave 
rise to a constellation that was unique compared to nation building processes in 
other European countries. Italian nationalism faced not only Catholic Austria 
but also the Papal States. Thus advocating national unity interfered with the 
religious conviction of most Italians. Not only was the centre of the world 
Catholic Church located on Italian territory, it also ruled over a theocratic state 
in the middle of this territory. This was simply incompatible with the concept 
of a modern nation state. 
Yet there were also federalists in the anti-clerical, democratic-republican 
camp, the most famous among them were Carlo Cattaneo and Giuseppe Ferrari. 
Based on Italy’s heterogeneity but also influenced by philosophers such as 
Alexis de Tocqueville, who were critical of the French Revolution, they cham-
pioned the political system of the USA and merely wanted the state to be a 
“weak” umbrella structure with general leading tasks and highly autonomous 
single territories. Instead of centralist reforms “from above,” the democratic 
federalists pinned their hopes on mobilising the society and changes “from 
below.” As a result, the Italian unification proved to be “work in progress” in 
terms of Italy’s federal structure. In summer 1860 – Garibaldi was just about to 
conquer southern Italy – the Piedmont Minister of the Interior Farini, who also 
headed a commission that was to draw up suggestions for the future structure 
of the Italian state, demanded to follow Italy’s ‘natural structure’ (membrature 
naturali) and to create six political regions: Piedmont, Sardinia, Liguria, Lom-
bardy, Emilia and Tuscany. Thus Farini’s suggested federal structure was based 
on regions of similar size, which consisted of several provinces (the equivalent 
of English districts or German Kreise) as second level of the new nation state, 
instead of historically developed states like in Switzerland and the North Ger-
man Confederation/Imperial Germany. However, before a corresponding law 
could be drawn up, political events – the collapse of the Kingdom of Two 
Sicilies and the foreseeable unification with the new nation state – overtook 
these plans (Seitz 1997, 40-4). 
The majority of the political elite was by no means in favour of the unifica-
tion with the South. They did not want to create a new state but transfer the 
existing political structures of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia to the King-
dom of Italy. This was, in my view, the most important reason why from au-
tumn 1860 different federal models were discussed but had no chance of being 
                                                             
2  Most importantly, how was the universalist religious claim of the pope on being the leader 
of all Catholics worldwide and the territorial sovereign of the Papal States to be integrated 
into an Italian federal State? 
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realised when the Italian nation state was founded. Still in 1860, Garibaldi set 
up a regional council in the conquered South; and even Cavour promised the 
South autonomy after the collapse of the Bourbon monarchy. But already in 
November 1860, Farini’s successor, the Minister of the Interior Marco Min-
ghetti, presented a revised plan for the new state structure, which was diametri-
cally opposed to Farini’s intentions (Seitz 1997, 40).3 Minghetti considered the 
provinces the pillars of the central state. Although his plan provided for an 
intermediate level (consorzi interproviniciali) responsible for public contracts, 
higher education, cultivation, hunting and fishing, it should only facilitate the 
transition to a centralised state (facilitare il trapasso dallo stato della divi-
sione). Just as the provinces were governed by a prefect appointed by the cen-
tral government, governors should be representatives of and answer to the 
minister of the interior. And yet even this rather centralist model had no chance 
to pass parliament and was declined in June 1861. Consequently, Prime Minis-
ter Ricasoli suspended the existing regional governments in Florence, Naples, 
and Palermo in early October and rescinded autonomy for Tuscany and the 
former Kingdom of Two Sicilies. 
The leading politician of the risorgimento movement, the National Liberal 
Camillo Cavour, left no doubt about why the concept of regionalisation that 
had previously been believed sensible was now abandoned: he considered 
military rule the only possible form of government in the “weakest and most 
corrupt part of Italy,” as he put it – and referred to the South of Italy that had 
come to the Kingdom of Italy due to Garibaldi’s high-handed actions and ex-
plicitly against Cavour’s plans. Cavour and his liberal progressive fellow cam-
paigners were convinced that a dictatorship over South Italy would in the long 
term foster an efficient administration and modernise the economy. Napoleonic 
centralism based on the Jacobinic concept of the unitary state that was charac-
terised by a centre-periphery cleavage served as blue print for the administra-
tive structure, which was supposed to unify different regional traditions and 
prerequisites. An alternative proposal providing self-governing regional rights 
was rejected by the parliamentary majority, since it was their objective to mod-
ernise the backward areas in the South and on the islands through an educa-
tional dictatorship. In 1865, the Kingdom of Italy was subdivided into 69 prov-
inces along the lines of French administrative structures. A prefect served as 
the extended arm of the central government. Tax law was standardised, which 
favoured the North. A centralised structure was implemented in Italy although 
the original concepts of the most important pioneers of the nation state founda-
tion, Cavour and Mazzini, entailed federal elements – whether in regard to a 
potential merger into the United States of Europe or by emphasising the signif-
icance of local self-government (Seitz 1977, 37-39, 45; Ganci 1981). 
                                                             
3  Therefore it makes no sense to subsume both plans as ‘regionalisation projects’ under a 
‘Farini-Minghetti-proposal.’ 
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Since the downfall of the Bourbons in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the 
governing Liberals gradually radicalised: they always favoured the centralist 
solution over federalist alternatives that were also discussed in order to consol-
idate their power and to push through their objective to educate the backward 
regions of the swiftly established nation state. Their key argument (similar to 
the French Revolution) was that the provinces, the regions – and particularly 
the southern parts of the country – were the source of the “reaction,” of cleri-
calism, and “superstition” jeopardising the modernising project of the nation 
state unification. And indeed, in the 1860s a rebellion started in South Italy 
against the demands of the new nation state (taxes, conscription, compulsory 
schooling, etc.). The uprising was quelled by the central state with the utmost 
effort. This conflict turned into a civil war with more casualties than all unifica-
tion wars against Austria combined (see Jansen 2012, 179-202). Several upris-
ings against the central government kept flaring up particularly in Sicily in the 
course of the nineteenth century. It is impossible to decide whether these riots 
were exclusively directed against centralism and whether a different political 
strategy by the central government would have prevented them. 
Not only political opposition, but also the obvious economic problems of the 
South, which were investigated in-depth by parliamentary committees and 
social scientists (Cassata 2011, 10-21; Frigessi 2003; Gibson 2002),4 in the late 
nineteenth century, resulted from 1895 in an anti-centralist current called me-
ridionalism (meridione = South). A number of influential opposition politicians 
were meridionalists ranging from the Socialist historian Gaetano Salvemini to 
the leader of the Communist Party Antonio Gramsci to the founder of the 
Catholic People’s Party (forerunner party of the Democrazia Cristiana) Luigi 
Sturzo. Tellingly, they were all from the South. Their initiatives did not have 
much influence on the decision-making process of the government. However, 
they raised the awareness of the political elites and introduced the “question of 
the South” into the public discourse understood as a social issue that had to be 
resolved by the central government. Martina Seitz rightly stresses that although 
an autonomous movement emerged in Sicily, the continental South in general 
lacked political regionalism. She explains this “surprising fact” by pointing at 
the “radical suppression of separatist tendencies” during the Italian civil war of 
the 1860s, as well as at “semi-feudalist conditions” and the “impact of the 
Church.” All this prevented a politicisation of the people in the South (on me-
ridionalist tendencies see Seitz 1997, 49-53; e.g. Rerum Scriptor 1900). 
As other key aspects we could add clientelism and certain specific character-
istics of Italian politics. Members of parliament played a far more important 
role than organised parties and voters’ ideological affiliations to political par-
                                                             
4  One of the most influential was the anthropologist Cesare Lombroso, who interpreted the 
peculiarities of the South in an anthropological/racialist fashion.  
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ties.5 They were supposed to establish a relationship to the centre (raccordo al 
centro) on behalf of their voters (clients) and to see that as many resources as 
possible were brought into their constituencies. Alexander Grasse and Frances-
ca Gelli have pointed out that this clientelism in the country of 100 cities com-
bined with a distinct localism (campanilismo) (Cavazza 2012, 70 et seq.)6 was 
the reason that “in Italy the formation of the modern state was a process that 
took place mainly at local and regional level, regardless of Italian centralism.” 
We do not have to clarify here whether the development in Italy differs from 
France, or whether even French centralism was more assertion and ideology 
than reality. However, Grasse and Gelli are certainly right when they argue that 
Rome in Italy “was never able to fulfil the function that Paris had always per-
formed in the French central state.” Stefano Cavazza has coined the expression 
of “a weak centralism” for liberal Italy (Grasse and Gelli 2012, 187; Cavazza 
2012, 72). Yet this was less the result of certain political objectives and (failed) 
efforts of Italian governments towards centralism (on the federalist tradition see 
Cavazza 2012, 71-78).7 Historical traditions in Italy and France differed consid-
erably: Rome became the capital of Italy only in 1871 and was little respected, 
whereas Paris had been the centre of the French state since the Middle Ages. 
Cavazza convincingly demonstrates that localism and regionalism in Italy 
before 1945 was never opposed to the nation state and had a rather cultural and 
folkloristic character. They were politically explosive only in one situation: 
strikingly, when the Sicilian Francesco Crispi was prime minister, the demo-
cratic-republican opposition in the North, drawing on Cattaneo and other feder-
alist theorists, demanded devolution and decentralisation based on allegations 
of a ‘corrupt’ South in contrast to a ‘moral’ North.8 
In the South neither regionalism nor separatism ever emerged unlike in the 
Basque region, Ireland, Scotland, Normandy or Corsica, although the political 
discourse of meridionalism in Italy also explained regional disadvantages with 
colonial dependency. The political elites in southern Italy considered it more 
promising and beneficial to receive sinecures and resources from the centre and 
to distribute them locally than to solve problems autonomously. On these 
grounds the only serious separatist movement in the South, which emerged in 
Sicily, soon played itself out after 1945. Also, criminal secret organisations such 
as the Mafia opted for centralism (see Jansen 2012, 2007, 95-99), after they had 
initially supported the autonomist movement in the immediate post-war period 
                                                             
5  In this context the most complex phenomenon of trasformismo could be mentioned, but to 
go into this in detail would take us too far afield.  
6  In this important article on the topic Cavazza translates campanilismo as municipalism. 
7  Cavazza points at the paradox that “it was actually Piemonte’s weakness that led to a centralist 
solution as it could not ensure unity against opposition from the other states,” p. 74. 
8  Ibid., p. 78 et seq.: “The incontestable fact is that two moralities prevail in Italy [...]. In moral 
terms Rome and Naples are another world from Milan and Turin” (Morale nord e morale 
Sud, in: L’Italia del Popolo, January 8/9, 1895, quoted from ibid., p. 79).  
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but soon realised that the centralist system was more profitable for them. From 
then on the autonomist movement was condemned to a shadowy existence. 
4.  The Constitution of 1947: Regionalisation – in Name 
Only 
After the war experience of 1915-1918 had significantly fostered the nation 
building process, the twenty years of Fascist rule (1922-1943) marked the 
heyday of centralisation efforts in Italy. Notably, the Fascist regime abandoned 
municipal self-government. Local mayors (podestá) were now appointed in 
Rome just as province governors before. At the same time, Fascism encouraged 
local cultural traditions, especially the so-called people’s culture (cultura popo-
lare) (see Cavazza 2003).  
After the authoritarian and centralist modernisation projects of Fascism, the 
strategies of the 1860s were perceived as misguided for a heterogeneous country. 
Moreover, separatist movements – apart from Sicily also in the Aosta Valley, 
South Tyrol and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, which were directed against neighbour 
nation states – put considerable pressure on reorganisation efforts at the end of 
World War II. An all-party government, established by the Allies, decreed 
autonomy statutes for Sardinia (January 27, 1944), Sicily (March 18, 1944) and 
the Aosta Valley, where the anti-Fascist resistance movement was very strong 
(August 7, 1945), even before the war was over and in anticipation of the de-
bates on a new constitution. With Mussolini’s fall in 1943 the nation state had 
collapsed and the country was effectively divided (1943-1945). South of the 
front advancing north the Anglo-American occupiers dominated; in the North 
the Germans and the puppet republic of Saló were in charge. The resistenza, 
the foundation myth of Italian post-war politics, was active only in a few re-
gions of the North. Thus, after governments from 1915 to 1943 had made ef-
forts to unify the country, federalist tendencies in 1945 were stronger than ever 
since the risorgimento. 
The Italian constitution, enacted in 1947, coming into effect on January 1, 
1948, was a compromise between the Catholic camp and the laicist Left. Both 
political camps were heterogeneous. They not only mirrored the North-South 
divide. The Catholic bloc, which consisted of the largest party Democrazia 
Cristiana and some smaller parties and was supported by the clergy, was split 
in an authoritarian and a Christian-democratic faction. The political Left, a 
democratic-republican group, comprised Socialists (PSI) and Communists 
(PCI). Regarding the question of regionalisation Jacobinic centralism opposed 
the principle of subsidiarity of Catholic social teaching, as provided in the 
encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and – forty years later based on this – 
Quadrigesimo anno. This principle advocated a weak state and gave priority 
and autonomy to the lower level of the multi-level governance system, whereas 
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the higher level was supposed to support the lower levels financially. Both 
large political camps had experienced Fascism and anti-Fascist resistance, thus 
the constituent assembly was overall sceptical towards a strong state. Also, the 
ideological pioneers of both camps – Luigi Sturzo for the DC and Antonio 
Gramsci for the PCI – were meridionalists.  
Consequently, the constitution provided for decentralism and regionalism. 
However, various provisions were contradictory (as many other important 
compromises). The first part of the constitution stipulated basic principles 
(principi fondamentali) and article 5 stated that the Republic of Italy was una e 
individibile, a Jacobinic slogan from the French Revolution. Yet the following 
sentence recognised le autonomie locali (local or municipal autonomy) and 
declared più ampio decentramento amministrativo (greatest possible adminis-
trative decentralisation). Moreover, the fifth part of the constitution regulated 
“the regions, the provinces, the municipalities” (art. 114-133). It was the first 
time that an Italian constitution even mentioned regions, their rights and (pre-
dominantly) their obligations in no less than eleven articles (117-127) in detail. 
These regulations remained by and large in effect until a substantial reform in 
1997, which strengthened the position of the regions. 
Article 116 of the constitution stipulates in particular two new autonomous 
regions apart from those established already in 1944/45: “Trentino-Alto Adi-
ge/South Tyrol” and “Friuli-Venezia Giulia.” Yet the special rights of the five 
autonomous regions were not further defined; the following ten articles of the 
constitution only mention regioni in general. Article 117 stipulated the legisla-
tive powers of the regions. At the same time, it gave priority to the legislation 
of the central state and declared that regional laws should not be contrary to the 
“national interest” nor to the interest of other regions (non siano in contrasto 
con l’interesse nazionale e con quello di altre Regioni). The regions’ compe-
tences entailed local and regional administration, economy (including tourism), 
infrastructure and transportation, each of them limited by national legislation. 
Accordingly, article 119 granted the regions “financial autonomy” – but only 
limited by the central state’s legislative. The South question is first mentioned 
here: the ‘state’ could support the South and the islands by granting them special 
subsidies (contributi speciali). Article 118 of the constitution laid down the 
competences of the regions, which were sandwiched between local and central 
state responsibilities and thus rather limited, particularly since the regions were 
supposed to exercise their administrative function by delegating it to municipali-
ties, provinces and other local bodies. A regional administrative apparatus was 
not intended. Article 120 explicitly limited the power of the regions and thus 
their leverage to put pressure on the central state. They were neither allowed to 
collect duties nor to impede free movement and goods traffic within Italy. 
Article 121 to 127 determined the political bodies of the regions (art. 121 
defines the regional council as legislative, government as executive and the 
president as representative of the region and head of administration), the elec-
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toral procedure (determined by the central state) and the framework of the 
regional parliaments’ tasks (art. 122), the constitutions of the regions (art. 123) 
and their jurisdiction (art. 125). The whole tenor of these regulations was re-
strictive. They repeatedly stressed the priority of the central state: art. 124 
provided for a government commissioner based in the regional capital, who 
was supposed to coordinate state/federal and regional administration as admin-
istrative head. Art. 126 exclusively addressed the dissolution of the regional 
parliaments, which was possible on the grounds of “national security”; art. 127 
provided that every bill voted by a regional parliament could only come into 
effect after the government commissioner had released it for publication. Ac-
cordingly, the central government could reject laws of the regional parliament, 
when they were contrary to “national interests” and to the interests of other 
regions. The regions were granted legal supervision of their provinces and 
municipalities by art. 130, art. 131 provided a list of nineteen regions (see 
Figure 2). Art. 132 described how regions could merge or be newly established 
and how provinces and municipalities could switch from one region to another 
– a referendum was required to do so. There was only one case since 1948: the 
decision in 1963 to split Abruzzi from Molise realised in 1970.  
Figure 2: Italy and Its Regions 
 
Source:  <ww.vidiani.com/maps/maps_of_europe/maps_of_italy/detailed_wine_map_of_italy.jpg> 
(Accessed May 7, 2017). 
 
Apart from the islands Sardinia and Sicily, independent kingdoms during early 
modern times, with their natural borders, no other region that was established 
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in 1947 had the same borders as their predecessor states (unlike Bavaria, Ham-
burg and Bremen in the Federal Republic of Germany), even though most 
regions could be traced back to historical territories and states and invented 
traditions accordingly, such as Tuscany to the former Grand Duchy (1569-
1861), Lombardy to various, very different territories of the same name, Ligu-
ria and Venetia to the glorious maritime republics of Genoa and Venice, Pied-
mont to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and Latium, Basilicata (Lucania), 
Campania, Apulia in some cases to ancient tribes and territories. Whereas the 
twenty regions are relatively homogeneous in size (Sicily, the largest, is rough-
ly eight times the size of the Aosta Valley; in contrast, Bavaria is two hundred 
times the size of Bremen), they differ significantly in population: Lombardy 
has 10 million, the Aosta Valley only 120,000 inhabitants (a ratio of 100:1, the 
ratio between the population figure of North Rhine-Westphalia and Bremen, 
the two extremes, is only 27:1). 
Despite the experiences during centralist Fascism and notwithstanding con-
tradictory statements the majority of Italian politicians (although women were 
allowed to vote since 1946, nearly all politicians were male) acted in continuity 
with the constitutional and administrative tradition of Liberal Italy since the 
1860s. Administrative decentralisation and regionalisation on the entire penin-
sula are stipulated by the constitution. But apart from the five autonomous 
regions, these innovations remained irrelevant until the 1970s. Whereas non-
autonomous regions existed in name only until 1970, the five autonomous 
regions were given a special constitution (statuto speciale) by granting them 
leggi costituzionali (constitutional laws)9 in February 1948, that is shortly after 
adopting the constitution (Friuli-Venezia Giulia in January 1963, after the Cold 
War had calmed down),10 which allowed them financial autonomy in particular, 
but also extensive legislative and administrative powers. 
The important disparity in Italy’s constitutional and legal history between 
paese legale – legal regulations – and paese reale – the reality of life became, 
once again, obvious in the persistent deficiencies of the regionalisation process. 
Another reason was that the political front lines changed to the opposite under 
the first and very influential prime minister Alcide De Gasperi and his succes-
sors, who all came from the state party of the First Republic, Democrazia Cris-
tiana. The DC, which traditionally advocated federalism, gradually turned into 
a centralist party when it was in government and tried to prevent a restriction of 
its power almost at all costs. It rhetorically employed the principle of subsidiar-
ity but increasingly ignored it in reality. 
                                                             
9  Type of legislation with higher requirements, for instance a vote in both chambers of par-
liament. 
10  Due to the controversial border between Italy and Yugoslavia and the status of Trieste (“free 
territory” until 1954, then part of Italy) the constitution of Friuli-Venezia Giulia was not 
adopted before 1963 since the government required the votes of the opposition. 
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Table 1: Socio-Economic Indicators for the Twenty Italian Regions from 1951 
to 2012 
 Population 
(millions) 
Incid. of 
Poverty 
Index of per Capita Income  
(Italy = 100) 
Saldo per 
Capita 
 2013 2006 1951 1970 1980 1997 2012  2005  
Piedmont 4.4 7.1% 153 124 118 116 108 (9) 469 (5) 
Lombardy 10.1 3.7% 159 135 131 129 128 (3) 3,3653 (1) 
Liguria 1.6 5.2% 154 119 112 118 106 (10) 1,368 (11) 
Trentino/ 
South Tyrol 1.1 5.1% 113 106 119 128 132 (1) 388 (6) 
Aosta Valley 0.1 6.8% n/s n/s n/s n/s 134 (1) 809 (10) 
Venezia 4.9 4.5% 88 107 110 123 115 (5) 1,836 (2) 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 1.2 7.2% 117 103 114 125 113 (6) 212 (7) 
Emilia-Rom. 4.5 2.5% 105 115 131 130 122 (4) 1,751 (3) 
Tuscany 3.8 4.6% 99 110 110 109 109 (8) 160 (8) 
Umbria 0,9 7.3% 80 90 101 96 90 (12) -1.785 (13) 
Marche 1.5 5.4% 75 92 108 108 99 (11) -146 (9) 
Latium 5.9 6.8% 104 108 102 112 113 (6) 737 (4) 
Abruzzo 1.3 11.8% 62 73 84 89 87 (13) -1.394 (12) 
Molise 0.3 21.5% 62 73 80 82 78 (14) -2.510 (18) 
Camparia 5.9 27.0% 71 70 66 62 63 (20) -2.311 (15) 
Apulia 4.1 19.4% 64 74 71 67 67 (16) -2.056 (14) 
Basilicata 0.6 24.5% 53 63 68 65 70 (14) -2.313 (16) 
Calabria 2.0 23.3% 53 58 57 57 64 (19) -2.817 (20) 
Sicily 5.1 30.8% 62 66 66 63 65 (18) -2.661 (19) 
Sardinia 1.7 15.9% 80 79 72 75 76 (15) -2.361 (17) 
The columns show from left to right: Population (2013), proportion of poor people among the 
population (2006), index of per capita income in five year steps between 1950 and 2012; 
balance of government revenue and expenditures per capita (2005). Rank in parenthesis in 
both columns (1-20). 
Sources: col. 1 and 7: <https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regione_(Italia)>; col. 2: Incidence of 
poverty, cf. Ambrosania , Bordignon and Cerniglia 2008, col. 3-5: SVIMEZ 1961 und 1998, in: 
McCarthy, 61; col. 8: CENSIS, 27o rapporto sulla situazione del paese, Milano 1993, 666. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the still significant North-South divide regarding income and 
living standard despite impressive economic successes. Overall, differences 
levelled down over the years, but still remained higher than the European aver-
age: in the industrial North with its steel and car industry and roughly a third of 
the Italian population, the per capita gross domestic product in the late 1960s 
was between 30 and 50 percent above national average. In the South, on the 
other hand, with almost 40 per cent of the population, it was 30 to 50 percent 
below average. In no other European country was the economic gradient as 
steep as in Italy. In France, the area surrounding Paris accounted for a gross 
domestic product above the national average, whereas all other regions were 
inferior to the average gross domestic product with 85 to 95 percent. In Germany, 
the GDP of all administrative districts (Regierungsbezirk) apart from Hamburg 
ranged between 80 and 120 percent of the average. By supporting economically 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  281 
weak regions and taking compensatory measures (such as the inter-state fiscal 
adjustment in Germany) regional differences were levelled in other European 
countries to a much higher extent than in Italy – despite enormous modernisa-
tion programmes.11 
Few regions in Italy show a continuous development: only the two autono-
mous regions Trentino/South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley (albeit figures about 
these areas are incomplete) and the capital area Latium were able to improve 
during the industrial (1945-1980) and the post-industrial phase (since 1980) of 
Italy’s economic development, compared to national average. Trentino/South 
Tyrol and the Aosta Valley used their autonomous status to benefit economi-
cally, the other three autonomous regions failed to do so. The continuously 
improving economic performance of the capital area was grist to the mill of 
those who considered Rome mushrooming at the expense of the whole country. 
Roma – ladrona, was one of the most effective propaganda slogans of the Lega 
Nord, the party that represented the interests of the North and at times even 
strove for secession. These slogans fell on fertile ground, not least because the 
triangle Piedmont-Lombardy-Liguria that had been a thriving industrial area 
from the late nineteenth century continuously lost its profound lead in wealth. 
This was particularly true for Liguria, which fell back from second to tenth 
place in the ranking of the regions. Lombardy, on the other hand, the most 
populous region with roughly a sixth of the national population, also lost its 
previous rank compared to national average, but still has the highest income 
per capita of all non-autonomous regions. The development in most of the 
other regions in the ‘North East and the centre’ is overall positive (see key of 
Figure 2), namely Emilia-Romagna, Venetia, Tuscany and Marche. The eco-
nomic performance of Umbria and Friuli-Venezia Giulia is markedly different 
from the successful NEC-regions (Jansen 2007, 81-5).12  
Despite its overall rising prosperity, the South failed to reduce the gap be-
tween its own economic output and national average, both during the economic 
miracle and the post-industrial phase. The indices show considerable differ-
ences between the Southern regions. Whereas Campania (surrounding Naples) 
and Sardinia continuously fell back and Sicily stagnated, the other regions 
caught up, above all Abruzzo, the most Northern region of the South, which 
benefited from the vicinity of successful Central Italy (+ 25 points). The eco-
nomic performance of the small Basilicata is also impressive (+ 17 points). 
After a long period of stagnation Calabria has improved significantly since the 
turn of the millennium and has no longer the lowest income per capita – at 
present Campania comes in last. Despite some achievements due to land re-
                                                             
11  On the little impact of the modernisation programmes for the Southern regions see Jansen 
2007, 99 et seq. 
12  The NEC regions (Italian abbreviation for North Eastern and Central Italy) are seen as success 
stories of the diffuse industrialisation (modello NEC industrializzazione diffusa).  
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form, infrastructure measures and tourism, the South clearly lags behind North 
and Central Italy up to the present regarding other economic and social indicators 
such as GDP, income per capita, unemployment rate, educational attainments and 
cultural and social opportunities. Unemployment and particularly youth unem-
ployment is three times higher in the South than in the North. Further indicators 
(unemployment rate, female employment, employment structure, educational 
attainments, family size, etc.) confirm that Italy is still deeply divided along the 
centuries old border between the former Kingdom of Naples and the Papal States. 
Despite multibillion investments from Rome and later from Brussels, unemploy-
ment remained higher, female employment lower. Whereas in 1950 three quarters 
of the work force in the Southern regions worked in agriculture, about the same 
number of people are employed in the service sector today. Industrialising the 
South by spending a lot of money proved to be a flash in the pan: after the per-
centage of industrial workers had doubled between 1950 and 1970, it has fallen 
back to the same level as 1950 today.  
The North-South gap of the income per capita causes different consumer 
patterns: the consumption of meat and tobacco is statistically higher in the 
North than in mezzogiorno. However, these figures based on incomes from the 
state tobacco monopoly also indicate a problem, which has to take into consid-
eration in regard to the social and economic situation of South Italy: the pivotal 
role of the shadow economy that is not reflected by statistics. This entails 
smuggling (untaxed cigarettes), undeclared labour (ranging from neighbour-
hood assistance to the service sector to uninsured and untaxed work of family 
members in agriculture) and finally the underground economy controlled by 
criminal organisations with its most important sectors drug and arms dealing as 
well as human trafficking (refugees, prostitutes, and work slaves). Some of 
those deemed officially unemployed work in these areas. The South benefits 
highly from the shadow economy and is by no means as poor as official statis-
tics reflect. According to estimates, roughly 90 percent of shop owners in Cata-
nia (Sicily) pay protection money and 25 to 40 percent of the GDP in South 
Italy comes from criminal activities. In the late 1980s the per capita income in 
Palermo ranked 70th among the provinces, but per capita consumption 7th!  
The different regions in Italy can also be categorised according to their po-
litical structure. The Left (PCI and PSI in the First Republic until 1991, various 
centre-left alliances during the Second Republic and since 2007 Partito Demo-
cratico) dominated almost all bigger industrial cities and the “red belt” in Cen-
tral Italy from Liguria in the North West to the Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and 
Umbria to the Marches. Here, the Communists, second largest party in the First 
Republic but never part of the government, gained several power bastions by 
democratic means such as many municipalities and regions as well as the third 
channel of the public broadcaster RAI. The DC strongholds in the North were 
in the “white rectangle” of the Veneto region (Verona-Vicenza-Treviso-Padua), 
where the DC – its party colour is white – and its affiliated organisations show 
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an above average concentration. DC strongholds in South Italy were in the 
regions Marches, Abruzzo, Basilicata and Apulia. In Piedmont, Lombardy and 
in the Basilicata Democrazia Cristiana and the Left were about equal. This 
political situation in the regions remained the same throughout the entire First 
Republic. 
The right-wing Christian Democratic governments of the first fifteen repub-
lican years did not pursue a regionalisation policy as required by the constitu-
tion due to power-political reasons. Even the constitutional court made some 
decisions fostering centralism. A change of course didn’t happen until 1960 
and therefore sparked many hopes. The new slogan was centro-sinistra – the 
DC tried to involve the PSI into the governing coalition. The left-wing Catholic 
and social reformer Amintore Fanfani was the driving force of this new strate-
gy towards the Left in the DC. Apart from many other reforms he promised to 
implement regionalisation. Initially, resistance in the DC was insurmountable, 
since the establishment of regional governments and the extension of regional 
rights would have favoured the PCI in its strongholds of the ‘red belt.’ After 
all, parliament passed the statute of the last autonomous region Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia. When the regionalisation process was again postponed due to power-
political reasons, next to other unredeemed reform promises (sweeping reform 
of the school system, land reform, measures to reduce the North-South divide, 
reform of social insurances, tax reform, democratic urban development and 
anti-monopoly laws), frustration increased and finally turned into sharp politi-
cal confrontation during the years between 1968 and 1976.  
From 1946 considerable financial subsidies flowed into the South – the cen-
tralist equivalent of the German inter-state fiscal adjustment. These measures 
affected the economic North-South divide only marginally (see Jansen 2007, 99-
103), which contributed to the rise of regionalism in the North during the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1980s – we will look at this in detail later. At the same time – 
and initially more importantly – the continuous cash flow from ‘Rome,’ that is to 
say funded by the prosperous13 North, and from Brussels, funded by the Europe-
an partners, prevented separatism and political regionalism in mezzogiorno. 
It was not until 1968 in the context of a general wave of democratisation and 
pressured by social mass movements and massive protests that the Centre-Left 
governments implemented regional institutions as required by the constitution 
along with, for instance, the introduction of work councils. After a bill regard-
ing funding the regions (Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam 1993; for a list with the 
most important laws see Seitz 1997, 61) and against fierce opposition of the 
political Right, parliament passed an electoral law for the regional parliaments, 
which were elected in June 1970 for the first time. In 1970/71 the regional 
parliaments enacted constitutions influenced by the movement of 1968 that 
                                                             
13  I will not go into the question of whether a (post) colonial constellation or the North is 
responsible for the underdevelopment of the South.  
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entailed many plebiscitary aspects. The regionalisation process finally started 
in 1975. Faced with political violence first from the Right, then from the Left, 
the DC drew on the all-party coalition of the foundation years of the republic. 
At the same time and due to failing left-wing governments in the Western 
world (Cuba, Indonesia, Greece, Chile were the most frequently mentioned 
examples) the PCI was ready for a ‘historical compromise’ with the DC. Re-
gionalisation policy was the first practical realisation of this ‘historical com-
promise,’ the first successful cooperation of the two major political parties to 
overcome the political stalemate of the system of the First Republic. Two non-
autonomous regions drove the regionalisation process forward; Lombardy, 
where the left wing of the DC was strong, and Emilia-Romagna, a stronghold 
of the PCI, where the Communists pursued a pragmatic course, because its 
grassroots members had more to lose than their chains. The advocates of Italy’s 
regionalisation programme during the 1970s – apart from the left wing of the 
DC and PCI leaders, public opinion has to be considered as well in this context 
– wanted to widen the margins for political manoeuvre given the political 
stalemate at national level. There was even a majority to abolish the provinces, 
considered the extended arm of the central government, but too many people 
would have lost their profitable posts making this reform unenforceable.  
However, regionalisation made progress. Art. 117 of the constitution was fi-
nally realised in 1975 through the law No. 382 by determining norms for the 
cooperation between central and regional governments resulting in the inter-
leaving of powers, and partly in a competing legislation (contrary to the inten-
tion of the constitution). The decree-law14 No. 616 from 1977 shifted more 
political-administrative competences to the regions. They got financial auton-
omy and control of social and health services, public construction project, 
economic, urban, and regional development. Only through these regulations, 
did the regions which were governed by left leaning majorities after regional 
elections in 1974 (autonomous regions) and 1975 (non-autonomous regions), 
gain political competences. From now on, the regions controlled roughly a 
fourth of public spending. However, the level of autonomy differed a lot: 
whereas the autonomous regions received 50 percent of their income from the 
central state, it was roughly 90 percent for the non-autonomous regions, which 
were therefore still highly dependent from Rome (Seitz 1997, 62 et seq.; Grasse 
2005, 86-8; Gelli and Grasse, 190-3; Leonardi et al. 2003).  
Until the end of the First Republic (early 1990s) the regions used the emerg-
ing opportunities in different ways, depending on the political culture. In some 
cases parties acted in a clientelistic fashion and took advantage of the new 
institutions to put their own people on profitable administrative posts and se-
cure their political influence. According to a report of the newspaper Repubbli-
                                                             
14  Decreto legge – a type of legislation discussed and passed in parliamentary committees if a 
compromise can be reached that is agreed on by the opposition.  
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ca there were 427,889 professional politicians and political advisors in 2007. 
The roughly 1,000 members of the national and regional parliaments in Italy 
received a net salary of 14,000 €, twice as much as parliamentary allowances in 
Germany and France. Salaries were particularly high in the regional admin-
istration of Sicily, one of the poorest regions (Palermo and Woelk 2007, 328). 
Some regions developed into interesting laboratories, where citizen-oriented 
policy was tested and implemented, which will not be gone into here.15  
Two general developments during the 1980s and 1990s were the reason why 
regionalisation, even Italy’s transformation into a federal state, remained on the 
agenda and political conditions for decentralisation improved; progress on 
European integration and the emergence of new regionalist parties and sepa-
ratist tendencies. Having said this we still have to bear in mind that discussions 
on political reform in Italy during the last 50 years have been short-winded in 
general. Public opinion is highly volatile and implemented reforms are often 
not given enough time to settle. 
5.  Constitutional Reform since 1997 and Italy’s 
Transformation into a Federal State 
Given the obvious problems, a substantial constitutional reform was repeatedly 
discussed from the 1970s. In this context the Federal Republic of Germany 
with its similar Fascist history served as a model: the German constitution, 
adopted at the same time as the one in Italy, seemed to work more efficient. In 
a political climate favouring decentralisation not only Germany’s electoral 
franchise and chancellor democracy but also its federal structure with the two 
chambers Bundestag and Bundesrat was seen as exemplary (instead of the 
Italian bicameralismo perfetto with its House of Representatives and Senate). 
Apart from many other reasons and general disenchantment with the political 
system resulting in a tendency for experimentation, there are, in my view, two 
key reasons for this political mood. 
Firstly, in the 1980s and even more so during the euphoria of the years 
1989-1991 the nation state seemed to be obsolete. This is why both the supra-
national level of the European Union and the regional level gained importance. 
Secondly, new regionalist parties emerged: the Lega Nord in North Italy bene-
fited in particular from the traditional parties losing their legitimacy. It was 
formed as a merger of different parties influenced by a Europe-wide regionalist 
                                                             
15  To mention some examples of political scientific studies: Grasse 2005, 141-320, analyses the 
region Emilia-Romagna in great detail, less detailed Seitz, 109-68, “Autonomie und Funk-
tionsfähigkeit der italienischen Regionen am Beispiel Lombardei und Kampanien“, that is to 
say based on the poorest and the richest non-autonomous regions; Gelli and Grasse 2012, 
41-50 compare the political class in Apulia and Venezia.  
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wave and opposed to centralism and financial support for the South. By refer-
ring to nineteenth century federalists such as Carlo Cattaneo and Vincenzo 
Gioberti, the Lega championed the partition of Italy into three republics: the 
North called padania, Central Italy around Rome and the South. Using a mix-
ture of regionalism and populism, drastic and obscene slogans as well as folk-
loristic events, the Lega was highly successful at regional and municipal elec-
tions. Its political counterpart in the South was La Rete (the net). It had, at first 
sight, some similarities to the Lega: both movements were headed by a charis-
matic individual – Leoluca Orlando at La Rete and Umberto Bossi at the Lega 
Nord – and both profoundly benefited from a general weariness towards the 
political parties of the First Republic, since both movements saw themselves in 
opposition to the partitocrazia. But unlike the Lega Nord, La Rete wanted to 
achieve this objective by mobilising the Sicilians’ moral sense, by strengthening 
democratic and civil society structures and, in doing so, facing corruption and 
influence of the Mafia. La Rete was less successful than its northern counter-
part not only due to its lower population figures compared with the densely 
populated North and the Lega’s strongholds in Lombardy, Venezia and Pied-
mont, but also because Orlando did not use populism but laborious grassroots 
policy. Whereas the Lega Nord continued clientelistic policy supplemented by 
a new anti-centralist rhetoric, La Rete tried to combine activists of the civil 
society movement against the Mafia.  
The success of the new regionalist parties, and even more so the meteoric rise 
of Silvio Berlusconi and his anti-party Forza Italia (FI) (Jansen 2007, 210-20) 
signified the loss of legitimacy of the parties that had shaped the First Republic, 
in particular the government parties Democrazia Cristiana, PSI, etc., which 
disbanded in the early 1990s. Although PCI (Communists) and MSI (neo-
Fascists) – which had not been part of the government coalition – were less 
affected by this loss of legitimacy, they also rebranded as Partito Democratico 
della Sinistra (PDS/Democratic Party of the Left) and Alleanza Nazionale 
(AN/National Alliance).  
Whereas the constitution of 1947 largely remained unchanged until today, a 
new electoral law for both chambers of the Italian parliament was applied by 
national referendum, as the founding act of the Second Republic. Based on this 
law, four new electoral systems came into effect, at local level for municipali-
ties with less and more than 15,000 inhabitants and at provincial and regional 
level. Unlike at national level the electoral system at the lower levels were 
mostly two-tier majority voting systems with two victors of the first ballot 
facing each other in the second. Already in early 1993 parliament had decided 
on direct ballot for mayors. These innovations resulted in a more profound 
restructuring of municipal, provincial and regional politics than at national 
level with stable party coalitions and a strong personalisation of politics. The 
first direct ballots of mayors and municipal elections in autumn 1993 con-
firmed the dramatic loss of legitimacy of the political class. The populist slo-
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gans of Alleanza Nazionale and its right-wing partner parties gained massive 
results. However, the Left was victorious overall and expected great chances at 
the next national elections. The mayor elections were a disaster for the DC; 
they could only win in two out of 100 cities and remained below 15 percent in 
most of them. 
In the transition period from the First to the Second Republic, different po-
litical campaigns between June 1991 and April 1993 led to a broad Centre-Left 
alliance from the left wing of the DC to the Greens and La Rete to the succes-
sion parties of the PCI. Between 1994 and 2006 it stood for election at all lev-
els under varying names and constellations until it finally merged into Partito 
democratico. After the surprising election victory of the political right in March 
1994 and the first government under Berlusconi that soon failed, a cross-party 
government of experts gained power and called new elections. In 1994 the left-
wing parties had underestimated Berlusconi and due to their fragmentation had 
not taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the new electoral law that 
benefited party alliances. In 1996, they got it all right. In February the left-wing 
Catholic ‘People’s Party’ and the PCI successor PDS forged an alliance named 
Ulivo (olive tree), which was joined by most of the smaller parties of the politi-
cal centre. The Centre-Left coalition was able to effectively turn their votes 
into mandates in 1996. Although all right-wing parties apart from Forza Italia 
gained votes and got a majority of 52 percent, the Ulivo coalition under the ex-
Christian Democrat Romano Prodi could gain the majority of parliamentary 
seats. However, it depended on the support of a smaller left-wing party (Ri-
fondazione Comunista).  
The most ambitious plan of the first Prodi government was a federalist con-
stitutional reform. Immediately at the start of the legislative period the majority 
parties decided on establishing a Commissione bicamerale (committee of both 
chambers) that had already been implemented several times for the constitu-
tional reform. Whereas the government parties wanted to considerably reform 
the constitution, the opposition demanded to convene a constituent assembly to 
draft an entirely new constitution. However, the right-wing parties could not 
agree on what this new constitution would look like: AN and FI preferred a 
semi-presidential, centralist system along the lines of the French example, the 
Lega Nord championed an Italian confederation of states, at most a loose fed-
eral state. Initially the opposition pursued a merely destructive strategy: the 
bicamerale and the left-wing government were to fail in order to enforce elec-
tions for the constituent assembly. But since Berlusconi relied on the goodwill of 
the government parties due to the financial problems of his media empire, the 
oppositional boycott front soon dissolved. In late 1996 the opposition joined the 
constitutional reform committee that elected Massimo D’Alema (PDS) as chair-
man. In early 1997 even the members of the FI agreed to its task to revise the 
second part of the constitution until June 30, regarding the form of government, 
electoral law, and the relationship between the two chambers. In 185 sessions the 
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reform committee drafted considerable amendments: direct election of the state 
president; dissolution of the bicameralismo perfetto: the house of representatives 
should be the only body responsible for legislation and control of the govern-
ment. The senate, on the other hand, was only to appoint the highest judges and 
administrative civil servants and had to solve disagreements between regional 
and local bodies; strengthening of the government towards parliament; higher 
quotas for referenda; attributing a greater role to the regions and the principle of 
subsidiarity between the different administrative levels.  
However, this ambitious project failed, because Berlusconi refused to pass 
these reforms, which had been mutually agreed on by the committee. The 
chairman of the committee D’Alema and his party in particular made any effort 
to reach a compromise with Berlusconi, which almost went above and beyond 
of what grassroots members could be asked to agree on. Berlusconi’s main 
concern, on the other hand, was not institutional reform but curbing the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. For obvious reasons he primarily advocated the 
abolishment of charges such as “illegal funding of political parties” and “ac-
counting fraud” as well as amnesty of people accused of corruption. The official 
version of why the FI rejected the constitutional reform was that the future presi-
dent, who was to be elected directly, was granted too few rights. And yet, parlia-
ment and Forza Italia are not the only ones to blame for the failure of the Great 
Reform that had been discussed for decades. At least equally important was the 
lack of public pressure. The atmosphere of crisis from the 1990s had again given 
way to the willingness to adapt and accommodate in 1996. The collapse of the 
party system had caused no political and cultural revival. According to the public 
it was a crisis of the institutions rather than the society. Italians were neither 
prepared to change their own attitudes nor to actively work towards a reform of 
the institutions. 
Simultaneously and partly in the shadow of the public debates on these is-
sues, the left-wing parties carried out an extensive administrative reform, for 
which Franco Bassanini (PDS) was responsible. As far as it was feasible with-
out constitutional changes, the ‘Bassanini Laws’ decentralised the political 
system and gave the regions a greater role. At the same time, the previously 
omnipotent central government ceded competences to European institutions. 
The administration was reorganised, streamlined and made more efficient. 
Within government the prime minister was assigned more rights, the directly 
elected presidents of the regional governments accordingly. By the back door, 
the heads of governments were even granted the authority to lay down guide-
lines along the lines of the German Richtlinienkompetenz. Tellingly, the Bassa-
nini reform was implemented by two decrees, that is to say without parliamen-
tary approval (which seemed unlikely) and hence unconstitutionally. 
Prodi’s successor, the social democrat Giuliano Amato was able to carry out 
another constitutional reform in 2000/2001 by focusing on only a few aspects: 
regionalisation and subsidiary distribution of power between the four levels of 
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the political system (central government, regions, provinces and municipalities). 
Against the strong opposition of Berlusconi’s camp the constitutional reform was 
finally approved by a referendum on October 7, 2001. According to art. 138 of 
the constitution the plebiscite had been necessary, because the left-wing gov-
ernment did not have the majority for a constitutional amendment without the 
votes of the opposition. Although the Second Republic did not get a new con-
stitution, the small constitutional reform in 2001 did set a new course. Most 
importantly it drove forward decentralisation and reversed the balance of power 
between central state and regions. 
Art. 114 of the Italian constitution provided equality of the four political 
levels municipalities, provinces or città metropolitane, regions and ‘state’ and 
thus replaced centralism that had been the political system in Italy from the 
1860s. Art. 116 levels the differences between autonomous and non-
autonomous regions – yet there has been precious little sign of this so far be-
cause the latter adamantly insist on their privileges. The new art. 117 lists the 
competences of the central government: foreign policy, defence, protection of 
the environment, legal norms, social welfare, electoral rights, currency and 
duty policy, financial policy, citizenship and immigration. State and region 
have shared responsibility for about 20 areas. All other political and adminis-
trative responsibilities lie with the regions. Whereas previously the central state 
was in charge generally, today it is the regions that play a more important role 
in the multi-level governance system. In this context art. 119, which regulates 
the financial relationship between regions and central state, was revised. The 
central state’s financial priority over the lower levels was suspended; they were 
granted full control (autonomia finanziaria) of their incomes and expenditures 
and could levy taxes by themselves. Also, a compensation fund (fondo pe-
requativo) is planned to support regions with less tax incomes.16  
As mentioned above, Italy has always been characterised by a discrepancy 
between constitutional law and reality (paese legale/paese reale). In this sense 
the constitutional reform from 1997/2001 was only another important step 
towards Italy’s regionalisation. Initially this process was partly sabotaged by 
the following Berlusconi governments (2001-2006 and 2008-2011), because 
they had been implemented simultaneously to the fall of the centre-left gov-
ernments and against the new strong man Berlusconi. Since this course of 
action met considerable opposition and decentralisation was received favoura-
bly by the society, the attempts to reverse the constitutional reform failed. This 
was due partly to the opposition of experts, particularly constitutional experts, 
partly to disagreements within the right-wing coalition. The Lega Nord and FI 
advocated a federalist system, the two other parties (AN and UDC, that is the 
rest of the DC’s right wing) were centralist. When in 2006 the government tried 
                                                             
16  See Grasse 2005, p. 457-66, for all constitutional articles on the regions since October 18, 
2001 in the original and in German.  
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to implement a centralist constitutional reform against the opposition of em-
ployers, trade unions, oppositional parties and State President Ciampi, a refer-
endum was held. Berlusconi suffered a profound defeat with 61 percent of 
votes against his policy with a high turnout of 54 percent. The regions respond-
ed differently to the new opportunities – in 2007 only 12 regions had adapted 
their constitutions to the new balance of power, the last was Basilicata in early 
2016 (Palermo and Woelk, 330-34; Gelli and Grasse, 200 et seq.). 
Despite these delays, key areas of political decision-making are passed on to 
the lower levels. Italy is no longer a centralist state. This is shown, for instance, 
by comparing public expenditures at the end of the First Republic (1990) and in 
2006 (in percent):  
Table 2:  Public Expenditures, 1990 and 2006 (in percent) 
 
 
 
Expenditures for 
 
Central 
Government 
Lower Levels 
(Region, Province, 
Munipality) 
 
Social  
Insurance 
1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 
General Public Services 87 74 13 26 0 0 
Defense 100 100 0 0 0 0 
Public Safety 88 87 12 13 0 0 
Economic Policy 61 62 39 38 0 0 
Protection of Environment 13 15 87 85 0 0 
Housing / Public Institutions 17 9 70 91 12 0 
Leisure, Culture, Churches 30 35 70 65 0 0 
Education 77 73 23 27 0 0 
Social Security 17 2 4 5 79 95 
Total 49 35 27 30 24 34 
Source: Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia 2008, 8. 
 
What is most striking is the central state’s withdrawal from public expenditures 
during the neoliberal era, which will not be gone into here. As for the lower 
levels, the constitutional reform of 1997/2001 has not been resoundingly suc-
cessful. It was not until 2009 that the regions were granted financial autonomy 
by law and thus received a higher share of state revenues. But even before that, 
the financial situation of the three lower levels of the political systems had seen 
some profound changes. Earmarked money from the central institutions had 
been replaced by taxes levied by regional, provincial, and local institutions 
themselves or by shares of certain revenues. Since 1992 the regions collect 
revenues from motor vehicle tax, since 1995 parts of the fuel duty. In 1998 a 
regional tax on net production value (IRAP) was implemented and regions and 
municipalities benefited from an income tax rise. Since 2000 parts of VAT reve-
nues go to the regions. Whereas in 1992 the three lower levels created only 15 
percent of their income themselves (the rest came from the state), it was already 
45 percent in 2000 (Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia 2008, 3, 5, 9 et seq.). 
Although the regions’ scope of action has increased considerably since 1997 
due to decentralisation, the discrepancies between economically flourishing 
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and well-managed regions and those less fortunate have grown during the last 
two decades. Whereas rich regions such as the Aosta Valley or Trentino/South 
Tyrol could carry out expensive and prestigious projects – for instance the 
foundation of new universities in Bolzano and Aosta, which are well funded, 
not by the state such as other Italian universities but by the region17 – poorer 
regions, in particular in the South, have to keep up with shortage and scarcity. 
This however, can differ depending on the influence of the Mafia or similar 
organisations, illustrated by a comparison of the Basilicata with scarcely any 
Mafia activities and the neighbouring regions Campania and Calabria (on the 
continuously substantial economic differences Grasse 2005, 321-40; for a de-
tailed analysis of the regional developments see also: Donati 2012, 52 et seq.). 
The last column of Table 1 shows considerable compensation payments among 
different regions, which is one reason for the political discontent in the rich 
northern regions (Lombardy, Venezia, and Emilia-Romagna) that mainly pay 
for the others. Income and expenditures per capita of all state levels are bal-
anced in Table 1 showing that mostly southern regions benefit the most from 
these compensations including Liguria with the highest number of pensioners. 
Also, autonomous regions were often able to evade compensation payments as 
is shown by the fact that the rich Aosta Valley was a recipient region and the 
wealthiest region Trentino/South Tyrol did less than other regions of the north-
east (see Ambrosanio et al. 2008, 13-27; Gelli and Grasse, 205 et seq.). The 
great constitution reform carried out recently (April 2006) by Matteo Renzi 
further increased the position of the regions by abandoning the bicameralismo 
perfetto. The senate, second chamber and previously equal to the house of 
representatives, also elected according to a similar electoral law, was replaced 
by a federal assembly with 100 representatives from 20 regions.  
Since the mid-nineteenth century the Italian public has discussed a federal 
structure and decentralisation. In 1946 decentralisation as national objective 
was laid down in the constitution, but was initially implemented only gradually 
and merely in the autonomous regions, as well as against fierce opposition such 
as in South Tyrol in the 1950s and 1960s. The general mobilisation of the soci-
ety after “1968” and the willingness of the two large parties DC and PCI to 
cooperate enabled a first regionalisation wave from the mid-1970s. In the 
course of the collapse of the First Republic, the left-wing government under 
Romano Prodi implemented the Bassanini Laws in 1997 against the fierce 
opposition of the political right headed by Berlusconi, and a constitutional 
reform in 2001. In so doing, Italy turned away from traditional centralism and 
                                                             
17  A telling example is the (small) university of Bolzano. In 2008 the vice chancellor received a 
salary of 190,000 € per annum, full professors got 96,000 € on average, associate professors 
roughly 67,000 € – which is a lot higher than the salary of professors at other Italian uni-
versities <http://www2.consiglio-bz.org/documenti_pdf/idap_218402.pdf> (Accessed April 
12, 2017). 
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experienced a regionalisation of the political system, even though only gradual-
ly and slowly. In hindsight, this process was often erratic and inconsistent, 
since none of the large political camps pursued a consistent and consequent 
course. The debate on decentralisation is highly ideological and cannot be 
quantified statistically – in particular in financial terms. Italian statistics are 
incomplete in general, and this is all the more true for highly controversial 
political fields.  
The reform from 1997 to 2001 radically restructured the Italian multi-level 
governance system and the balance of power. Given the 150-year-long central-
ist tradition since the foundation of the nation state, Italy’s regionalisation was 
indeed a ‘small revolution’ as Alexander Grasse, a renowned expert on this 
topic outside of Italy, has coined it. It seems that Italian politics will probably 
soon again oscillate between centralism and regionalism. One reason for this is 
the asymmetry of the Italian federalist system, which burdens the regions dif-
ferently and allows autonomous regions to evade compensatory solidarity. 
Recent political science theories in the context of the ‘scale-debate’ explain 
these shifts of power within the multi-level governance system by pointing at 
the complex processes of denationalisation and internationalisation of political 
organisations as well as a decreasing influence of state structures, and refer to 
the end of the ‘Fordist nation state’ (see Heeg 2008, 251-66; Gualini 2004). It 
is difficult for historians to answer the interesting questions raised in these 
debates: the existing source material does not yet allow those analyses, in par-
ticular regarding longer historical processes such as addressed in this article. 
History as an academic discipline, on the other hand, is less normative and 
theory oriented than political science and political economy. Therefore, histori-
ans have never assumed that theoretical constructs such as the ‘Fordist nation 
state’ and ‘politics of scale’ reflect the complexity of historical reality (as re-
constructed according to the source material). They are aware that these ‘reali-
ties’ are socially construed and nothing else than ‘transitory formations’ shaped 
by the respective actors and their mindsets. Therefore, the balance and structure 
of power have to be examined closely in every single case. Theoretical models 
can help to ask the right and always new questions. But they are of little use to 
find the right answers – all the more so in Italy, the country of the dietrologia, 
with complex structures difficult to understand behind the official political 
structures.  
It remains to be said that the Italian regions created after 1945 were some-
thing entirely new. Only few of them (in particular the autonomous regions, 
such as Tuscany and Lombardy) had been ‘imagined communities’ before, 
with references to older territories and special identities. In the other cases anti-
centralist resentments played a role, although they were quickly suppressed 
within the new state party Democrazia Cristiana in favour of a new stability of 
power. Later, conflicts over resources between the left-leaning opposition and 
the dominant Democrazia Cristiana as well as efforts to generate more effi-
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cient governance structures became increasingly important given the loss of 
legitimacy and the subsequent failure of the First Republic. In order to con-
clude how fruitful the ‘politics of scale’ approach might be for historical re-
search on Italy, much basic research is still needed.  
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